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The Principle of Indifference and the
Principal Principle are Incompatible
J. Dmitri Gallow
ThePrinciple of Indifference (POI) says that, in the absence of evidence,
you should distribute your credences evenly. The Principal Principle
(PP) says that, in the absence of evidence, you should align your cre-
dences with the chances. Pettigrew (2016) appears to accept both the
PP and the POI. Many other authors write as though Bayesians are free
to accept both of these principles. Hawthorne et al. (2017) even go
so far as to argue that the PP implies the POI.1 Pettigrew (2018) and
Titelbaum andHart (2018) found the flaws in their argument, but they
left untouched the Bayesian who accepts both the POI and the PP. This
Bayesian has contradicted themselves, since the POI and the PP are in-
compatible. Abiding the POI means violating the PP. So Bayesians can-
not accept both principles; theymust choose which, if either, to endorse.
1 The Principle of Indifference
LetΩ be the set of possibilities over which your credences are defined.2
If there are only finitely many possibilities inΩ, then the POI says that
each possibility should be given the same credence. That is, if C is a ra-
tional initial, or ur-prior, credence function—a credence functionwhich
it would be rational to hold in the absence of evidence—then, for each
ω ∈Ω, C(ω) = 1/#Ω.3
I’ll suppose that the possibilities over which your credences are de-
fined can be generated from some underlying language, which, for the
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1. More carefully, they argue that the PP implies that your credence in every atomic
proposition should be 1/2, which is strictly weaker than the POI.
2. More carefully, your credences are defined over subsets ofΩ. I’ll suppose throughout
that you have a credence in every singleton {ω}.
3. Notation: I use ‘#S ’ for the cardinality of the set S .
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sake of simplicity, I’ll take to be a truth-functional propositional lan-
guage. If the atomic propositions in this language are finite in number,
A1,A2, . . . ,AN , then the set of possibilities,Ω, will be finite. For we can
associate each possibility ω ∈Ω with a unique state description. A state
description is a conjunction of the form ±A1∧±A2∧ · · · ∧±AN , where
each ±Ai is either the atomic proposition Ai or its negation. Since the
language is truth-functional, a state description settles the truth-value
of every other proposition in the language, so that any two possibili-
ties which agree about a state description agree tout court. So there’s no
need to have multiple possibilities in which the same state description
is true; and we can take the possibilities and the state descriptions to
correspond one-to-one. Then, if there are N atomic sentences in your
language, there will be 2N state descriptions, and the cardinality of Ω
will be 2N . Then, the POI will say that your credence in each singleton
{ω} ⊂Ω should be 1/2N .
If there are countablymany possibilities, #Ω = ℵ0, the POI conflicts
with countable additivity and normalization (two standard axioms of
probability theory). Countable additivity says that, for any sequence of
pairwise disjoint subsets ofΩ, P1, P2, P3, . . . , your credence in the union
of the Pi ’s should be equal to the sum of your credence in each Pi . And
normalization says that your credence in Ω itself must be 100%. To
see that POI violates either countable additivity or normalization, con-
sider the singleton of every possibility inΩ: {ω1}, {ω2}, {ω3}, . . . . POI
says that your credence in each of these singletons must be the same.
It can either be positive or zero. If positive, C({ωi}) = α > 0, then∑∞
i=1C({ωi}) =
∑∞
i=1α =∞. But the union of all the singletons {ωi} is
justΩ itself. So countable additivity require would require C(Ω) =∞,
in violation of normalization. On the other hand, if you give credence
zero to each ωi ∈ Ω, then countable additivity will require your cre-
dence in Ω to be ∑∞i=1C({ωi}) = ∑∞i=10 = 0. But normalization re-
quires that C(Ω) = 1. So either way, POI will lead you to violate either
countable additivity or normalization.
Defenders of the POI could give up countable additivity, retreating
to the strictly weaker finite additivity, which only applies to finite se-
quences of pairwise disjoint subsets ofΩ.4 Or they could instead allow
that, in some cases, distributing your credences perfectly eventlywill vio-
4. That is: finite additivity says that, if P1, P2, . . . , PN are pairwise disjoint subsets of Ω,
then C
(⋃N
i=1 Pi
)
=
∑N
i=1C(Pi).
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late the probability axioms, but still insist that rationality requires you to
distribute your credences sufficiently evenly, while still complying with
countable additivity.5
With uncountably many possibilities in Ω, it is not entirely clear
what it even means to spread your credences among them equally. Ev-
ery uncountable subset ofΩ is as large as every other, so we might try
to say that every uncountable subset gets the same credence. But this
would lead us back into violations of additivity or normalization. Take
some uncountably infinite subsets of Ω, P and Q, such that P and Q
are disjoint and their union is Ω itself, P ∪Q = Ω. Then, additivity
(countable or finite) would tell us that C(Ω) = C(P ) +C(Q), and POI
(so understood) would tell us that C(Ω) = C(P ) = C(Q). But this im-
plies that C(Ω) = 0, in violation of normalization.
So, in the absence of some further structure on the setΩ, it’s not even
clear how to interpret the POI. The usual way the POI is implemented
when the set of possibilities is uncountably infinite involves imposing
some additional structure onΩ by finding some way of parameterizing
the possibilities inΩ. That is, we find some random variable, V which
maps every possibility in ω ∈Ω to some real number, V (ω) ∈ R.Then,
we can assign to each value v in the range of the variable V a credence
density, ρV (v). This density function doesn’t say what your credence
that V = v is.6 If you abide by the POI, your credence that V takes on
any particular value, v, will have to be zero. Instead, ρV (v) says how
dense your credence is at V = v. Think about it like this: for any narrow
interval [v,v + ϵ], the ratio C(V ∈ [v,v + ϵ])/ϵ is the density of your
credence over the interval [v,v + ϵ]. By taking the limit of this ratio as
ϵ goes to zero, we get the density of your credence at the point V = v,
ρV (v).
With a credence density function, ρV , we can get your credence that
V takes on any particular values by integrating over ρV . For instance,
your credence that V is between a and b will be given by
∫ b
a
ρV (v) dv.
And, in general, for any measurable set of values v, your credence that
5. This is the approach adopted by Williamson (2010). He says that the Shannon en-
tropy of your credences should be sufficiently high—while allowing that it may not be
maximal, because it could be that no probability function has maximal entropy.
6. I use ‘V = v’ to stand for the set of possibilities which V maps to v, V = v def= {ω ∈Ω |
V (ω) = v}. Likewise, ‘V ∈ v def= {ω ∈Ω | V (ω) ∈ v}.
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Figure 1: The uniform credence density overU . Your credence thatU lies in
the set u = [1/4,1/2]∪ [3/4,1] is given by the integral ∫uρU (u) du, which is
the area under the curve ρU (u) shown in grey.
V is within v is given by
∫
vρV (v) dv.
7 Then, the POI is implemented by
saying that your credences should have a uniform density. That is: every
value of v should have exactly the same credence density.
For instance: we can characterize each possibility by what percent-
age of space is unoccupied in that possibility. Call that variable U (for
unoccupied). The variableU can take on values between 0 and 1. Then,
POI says that the density of your credence should be uniform over these
values. This uniform credence density is shown in figure 1.
2 The Principal Principle
David Lewis (1980)’s principal principle says something about the con-
ditional credences of a rational initial, or ur-prior, credence function,
C. In particular, it says: if P is any proposition, t is some future time,
Cht(P ) = x is the proposition that the time t chance of P is x, for some
real number x ∈ [0,1], and E is any time t admissible proposition, then
C(P | Cht(P ) = x∧E) = x
Thetime twon’t be important inmydiscussion, so I’ll fix t to be some fu-
ture time and omit explicit mention of t in the remainder. Likewise, the
admissible proposition E won’t play any important role. So I’ll assume
only that the trivial propositionΩ is admissible at t, and setE =Ω. This
7. In general, we could characterize the possibilities inΩ with any finite number of real-
valued variables, V1,V2, . . . ,VN . Then, instead of having a density function onR, we’d
have a density function onRN . In the interests of simplicity, I’ll focus on the simplest
case, whereN = 1.
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leads to the following principle, which I’ll call ‘the PP’ from here on out:
C(P | Ch(P ) = x) = x(PP)
The PP governs your conditional credences; but I’ll suppose that
these conditional credences place a constraint on your unconditional
credences, via the product rule, which says that, for any propositions P
andQ, your credence in P ∧Q is equal to the product of your credence
that P givenQ and your credence thatQ.
C(P ∧Q) = C(P |Q) ·C(Q)
Then, so long as C(Q) > 0, your conditional credence in P , given Q, is
the ratio of your unconditional credence in P ∧Q and your uncondi-
tional credence in Q, C(P | Q) = C(P ∧Q)/C(Q). So a constraint on
your conditional credences will have consequences for your uncondi-
tional credences.
Rational credences are probabilities, so, conditional on any propo-
sition whatsoever, if your credence in P is x, then your credence in ¬P
must be 1− x. So if, conditional on Ch(P ) = x, your credence in P is x,
then, conditional onCh(P ) = x, your credence in ¬P must be 1−x. So,
supposing that C(Ch(P ) = x) > 0,
C(P | Ch(P ) = x)
C(¬P | Ch(P ) = x) =
x
1− x
C(P ∧Ch(P ) = x)/C(Ch(P ) = x)
C(¬P ∧Ch(P ) = x)/C(Ch(P ) = x) =
x
1− x
C(P ∧Ch(P ) = x)
C(¬P ∧Ch(P ) = x) =
x
1− x
C(P ∧Ch(P ) = x) = x
1− x ·C(¬P ∧Ch(P ) = x)(1)
Equation 1 follows from the PP. It will be important in §3 below.
Some Humeans do not accept the PP because it conflicts with their
metaphysical commitments.8 Nonetheless, those Humeans are happy
to accept a principle they call ‘the new principle’. Where the original
principal principle implores you to defer to the chances, the new prin-
ciple implores you to defer to the chances conditional on the true the-
8. See Hall (1994), Lewis (1994), and Thau (1994).
5
The Principle of Indifference and the Principal Principle are Incompatible
ory of chance. The differences between the new principle and the orig-
inal principal principle won’t be relevant to anything I say here. If you
favor the new principle, you can simply interpret ‘Ch(P ) = x’ as the
proposition that the time t chance of P—conditional on the true theory
of chance—is x.9 So understood, it will follow from the new principle
that C(P ∧Ch(P ) = x) = (x/(1− x)) ·C(¬P ∧Ch(P ) = x).
Suppose you want your credences to be defined over uncountably
many propositions of the form Ch(A) = x—one for each of the un-
countably many real numbers, x, between 0 and 1. Then, so long as
your credences are real valued, you’ll have to assign a credence of zero
to uncountablymany of the propositionsCh(A) = x. If your credence in
Ch(A) = x is zero, then the product rule will not impose any constraint
on the relationship between C(A | Ch(A) = x) and C(A∧Ch(A) = x).
Lewis was not concerned with this, because he allowed rational cre-
dences to take on infinitesimal values.10 So he thought that, even when
you’re spreading your credences over uncountably many propositions,
you needn’t give a credence of zero to any of them. If we agree with
him about this, then perhaps the PP is already general enough. But I’ve
been persuaded that Lewis was wrong to rely upon infinitesimals.11 If,
like me, you want your credences to be real-valued, then you should be
looking for a natural generalization of the PP for the case where you
have credences over uncountably many chance propositions.
Even though your credence that the chance of P is x will be zero for
any particular choice of x, your credence that the chance of P lies within
an interval of values [x,x + ϵ] (with ϵ > 0) can be non-zero, no matter
how small the interval [x,x + ϵ]. So a natural generalization of the PP
says that a rational ur-prior credence in P , given that the chance of P
lies in some interval [x,x+ ϵ], is within the interval [x,x+ ϵ]:
x ⩽ C(P | Ch(P ) ∈ [x,x+ ϵ]) ⩽ x+ ϵ(PP∗)
If your credence in P , given Ch(P ) ∈ [x,x + ϵ], is in the interval
[x,x + ϵ], then your credence in ¬P , given Ch(P ) ∈ [x,x + ϵ], is within
9. Cf. Hall and Arntzenius (2003).
10. See Lewis (1980, pp. 267–8).
11. See Williamson (2007), Easwaran (2014), and Hájek (ms, §7).
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the interval [1− x − ϵ,1− x]:
1− x − ϵ ⩽ C(¬P | Ch(P ) ∈ [x,x+ ϵ]) ⩽ 1− x
Following the same steps from our derivation of equation 1 above, we
get that, for any positive ϵ, no matter how small,
C(P ∧Ch(P ) ∈ [x,x+ ϵ]) ⩽ x+ ϵ
1− x − ϵ ·C(¬P ∧Ch(P ) ∈ [x,x+ ϵ])
and C(P ∧Ch(P ) ∈ [x,x+ ϵ]) ⩾ x
1− x ·C(¬P ∧Ch(P ) ∈ [x,x+ ϵ])
Divide both sides of these inequalities by ϵ, and take the limit as ϵ goes
to zero. Thereby, we get that the density of your credence in the conjunc-
tion P ∧Ch(P ) = xmust be x/(1−x) times the density of your credence
in the conjunction ¬P ∧Ch(P ) = x,
ρ(P ∧Ch(P ) = x) = x
1− x · ρ(¬P ∧Ch(P ) = x)(2)
Equation 2 follows from the PP∗. It will be important in §3 below.
3 The Incompatibility
Suppose that your credences are defined over a language which includes
only two atomic propositions: A and Ch(A) = 1/3. Then, there will
be four possible state descriptions: A ∧ Ch(A) = 1/3, A ∧ Ch(A) ,
1/3, ¬A ∧ Ch(A) = 1/3, and ¬A ∧ Ch(A) , 1/3. The POI requires
that your credence in A∧Ch(A) = 1/3 is the same as your credence in
¬A∧Ch(A) = 1/3. It says that both should be equal to 1/4th:
C(A∧Ch(A) = 1/3) = C(¬A∧Ch(A) = 1/3) = 1/4(3)
Whereas the PP implies that your credence in A∧Ch(A) = 1/3 must
be one half of your credence in ¬A∧Ch(A) = 1/3 (this follows from
equation 1):
C(A∧Ch(A) = 1/3) =
( 1/3
1− 1/3
)
·C(¬A∧Ch(A) = 1/3)
= (1/2) ·C(¬A∧Ch(A) = 1/3)(4)
The POI requires (3), while the PP requires (4). It’s not possible to satisfy
both (3) and (4). So the POI and the PP are incompatible.
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Perhaps the incompatability only arises because we chose an impov-
erished language. So let’s enrich our language by allowing in any finite
number of non-chancy atomic propositions, A1,A2, . . .AN , along with
any finite number of chancy atomic propositions of the form Ch(Ai) =
x, where Ai is an atomic proposition and x is a real number between
0 and 1. With multiple of these chance propositions included, a de-
fender of the POI will have to change the way they understand a state
description. To see why, notice that if we say that a state description is
a conjunction whose conjuncts include every atomic proposition or its
negation, then there could be state descriptions including the conjuncts
Ch(Ai) = x and Ch(Ai) = y, for x , y. This conjunction is known to
be impossible, so it should receive credence zero, but since the POI re-
quires you to give every state description the same credence, the POI
would require your credence in this known impossibility to be positive.
The solution is to say that, for each non-chancy atomic proposition,
Ai , a state description includes either Ai or its negation as a conjunct,
and, for each atomic proposition Aj which has a chance,12 the state de-
scription includes exactly one chancy atomic proposition of the form
Ch(Aj) = x, or else it includes the the negation of every proposition of
that form,∧xCh(Aj) , x.
Now, suppose that there’s at least one atomic propositionA such that
Ch(A) = x is a chancy atomic proposition with x , 1/2. Let SA,x be the
set of all state descriptions which include both A and Ch(A) = x. Then,
by finite additivity, your credence in the conjunction A ∧ Ch(A) = x
must be equal to the sum of your credence in every state description in
SA,x.
C(A∧Ch(A) = x) =
∑
S∈SA,x
C(S)
If you satisfy the POI, then every state description will receive the same
credence, so each summand in the above sum will be the same—call it
‘α’. So your credence thatA∧Ch(A) = x will be α times the number of
state descriptions in SA,x.
C(A∧Ch(A) = x) = α ·#SA,x(5)
12. I say that the atomic propositionAj has a chance iff there is some chancy atomic propo-
sition of the form Ch(Aj ) = x.
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In the same way, let S¬A,x be the set of all state descriptions which in-
clude both ¬A and Ch(A) = x. Again, by finite additivity, your cre-
dence in the conjunction ¬A∧Ch(A) = x must be equal to the sum of
your credence in every state description in S¬A,x. By the POI, each of
these state descriptions must be the same value, α. So your credence
that ¬A∧Ch(A) = x will be α times the number of state descriptions
in S¬A,x.
C(¬A∧Ch(A) = x) = α ·#S¬A,x(6)
But the number of state descriptions inSA,xmust be equal to the number
of state descriptions in S¬A,x. Take any S ∈ SA,x, replace ‘A’ with ‘¬A’,
and you have a state description S∗ ∈ S¬A,x. This associates each S ∈
SA,x with a unique S∗ ∈ S¬A,x, so#SA,x ⩽ #S¬A,x. For every S∗ ∈ S¬A,x,
replace ‘¬A’ with ‘A’, and you have a state description S ∈ SA,x. This
associates each S∗ ∈ S¬A,x with a unique S ∈ SA,x, so #S¬A,x ⩽ #SA,x.
So #SA,x = #S¬A,x. And this, together with (5) and (6), implies that
C(A∧Ch(A) = x) = C(¬A∧Ch(A) = x)(7)
But, since we stipulated that x , 1/2, (7) is incompatible with the PP,
which requires C(A∧Ch(A) = x) = (x/(1 − x)) ·C(¬A∧Ch(A) = x)
(recall equation 1).
But perhaps the incompatibility only arises becausewe have nomore
than a finite number of chancy atomic propositions of the formCh(A) =
x. So let’s open the door to uncountably many possibilities. For each
x ∈ [0,1], we will have a possibility in which the chance ofA is x. Then,
for each atomic propositionAwhich has a chance, wemay parameterize
this uncountably infinite space with a variable, V , defined to be 1¬A +
Ch(A). Here, ‘1¬A’ is the truth-value of ¬A , and ‘Ch(A)’ is the chance
ofA. So, if V is between 0 and 1, thenA is true and the value of V is the
chance ofA. And, if V is between 1 and 2, thenA is false, and the value
of V is the chance of A plus 1.13 The POI tells you to have a uniform
credence density over the values of V , as in figure 2.
13. We can have a similar variable for every atomic proposition which has a chance. By
assuming independence amongst all of the atomic propositions (an assumption the
defender of the POI should be happy to grant), we can generate a joint credence density
function over all of these variables from the uniform marginal densities. But we can
bring out the incompatibility of the POI and the PP∗ by just looking at the marginal
distribution over V .
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Figure 2: The uniform density over V = 1¬A +Ch(A) is required by the POI,
but is incompatible with the PP∗.
(a) (b)
Figure 3: Two sample credence densities over V = 1¬A +Ch(A) which abide
the PP. (In figure 3a, ρV is v between 0 and 1, 2 − v between 1 and 2, and 0
elsewhere. In figure 3b, ρV is 2v2 between 0 and 1, 6v − 2v2 − 4 between 1
and 2, and 0 elsewhere.)
But this is incompatible with the PP∗ (the generalization of the PP
for situations in which the number of potential chance hypotheses is
uncountably infinite). For the PP∗ requires that, for any v between 0
and 1,
ρV (v) =
v
1− v · ρV (1 + v)(8)
(Equation 8 follows from from equation 2, which itself follows from the
PP∗, as we saw in §2.) But the uniform credence density shown in figure
2 sets ρV (v) = ρV (1+v) = 1/2 for every value of v between 0 and 1. So
the uniform credence density will violate equation 8 for every value of
v other than v = 1/2. So the uniform credence density does not abide
the PP∗. (I’ve shown two sample credence densities which abide the PP∗
in figure 3.)
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4 Further Discussion
Following Lewis, I have formulated the PP and the PP∗ as principles
which, just like the POI, constrain rational initial credences. These prin-
ciples have nothing to dowith howyour credences are disposed to change
upon receiving evidence. Nonetheless, some defenders of the POI may
see hidden in the PP and the PP∗ a vestige of the principle of condition-
alization, according to which you should be disposed to update your
credences by conditioning on any newly acquired evidence. Those de-
fenders of the POI may wish to reject the PP and the PP∗ as I’ve ex-
plicitly formulated them, but accept nearby principles which, instead of
constraining your initial conditional credences, constrain the credences
you are disposed to adopt, upon learning what the chance of a proposi-
tion is. For instance, in response to an unrelated puzzle,Wallmann and
Williamson (2020, p. 3) suggest that the principal principle should be
understood as saying that CCh(P )=x(P ) = x, where CCh(P )=x is the cre-
dence function you are disposed to adopt, upon learning thatCh(P ) = x
and no more. The principle of conditionalization says that CCh(P )=x
should beC conditional onCh(P ) = x, so this proposed principle agrees
with thePPwhen conjoinedwith conditionalization. Williamson, how-
ever, rejects conditionalization. Instead, he says that, when your evi-
dence imposes constraints on your credences, you should adopt a prob-
ability which meets those constraints and which otherwise distributes
its probability evenly (or, perhaps, sufficiently evenly). Following Jaynes
(1957),Williamson calls this updating norm the principle of maximum
entropy. (The name comes from the fact that the evenness of your cre-
dence can be measured by its entropy.)
Notice that this response does not call into question my main con-
tention here, which is that the PP and the POI are incompatible. The re-
sponse acknowledges the incompatibility, but rejects the PP. It attempts
to mitigate this rejection by showing that there is some other norm gov-
erning the connection between your credence and chancewhich is com-
patible with the POI.
In many cases, the principle of maximum entropy will agree with
the principle of conditionalization. If C is defined over E, and you re-
ceive evidence which imposes the constraint that E receive credence 1,
then the updating norm of maximum entropy will require that CE is C
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conditioned on E.14 That is: if you already have a credence in E, and
your evidence imposes the constraint that your credence in E be 1, then
the norm of maximum entropy will tell you to update by conditioning
on the proposition E. So, if learning that Ch(P ) = x imposes the con-
straint that Ch(P ) = x be assigned a credence of 1, then CCh(P )=x(P )
will be equal to C(P | Ch(P ) = x). In that case, since the POI won’t set
C(P | Ch(P ) = x) equal to x unless x = 1/2, the principle of maximum
entropy won’t set CCh(P )=x(P ) equal to x unless x = 1/2, either.
Williamson doesn’t actually say that, upon learning that E, you
should update by imposing the sole evidential constraint that E be as-
signed credence 1. That’s how things work for the non-chancy proposi-
tions. But there’s something special about learning chance propositions.
Learning a chance proposition like Ch(P ) = x doesn’t only impose the
evidential constraint that C(Ch(P ) = x) = 1. It additional imposes the
evidential constraint that your credence in P be equal to x.15 Then, the
proposed revision of the PP is trivially satisfied: for any proposition P
and any real number x, CCh(P )=x(P ) will be x, by stipulation.
What if you just learn that the chance of P lies within some range
of values? In that case, Williamson says that your credence that P
must lie within that range.16 For illustration, suppose that you begin
with the credence distribution shown in figure 2, and you learn that
Ch(A) ⩾ 1/2. In that case, your credence that A is currently 1/2, so
you currently satisfy the constraint to have a credence in the interval
[1/2,1]. Moreover, your credence that A is independent of your cre-
dence that Ch(A) ⩾ 1/2, so C(A | Ch(A) ⩾ 1/2) = 1/2, and you will
still satisfy the constraint to have a credence in the interval [1/2,1] after
conditioning on the chance proposition Ch(A) = 1/2. So Williamson
won’t advise you to increase your credence inA at all, even though your
expectation of the chance of A has risen from 1/2 to 3/4ths.
We could try to get around this problem by insisting that the evi-
dence Ch(A) ⩾ 1/2 imposes the constraint that your credence that A
14. See Seidenfeld (1986)’s ‘Result1’, on page 471.
15. “Learning Ch(P ) = x does not merely impose the constraint C(Ch(P ) = x) = 1,
but also the constraint C(P ) = x” (Williamson, 2010, p. 79, with minor notational
changes).
16. More generally, he says that your credence that P must lie within the convex hull of the
numbers which might, for all your evidence has to say, be the chance of P . See §3.3.1
of Williamson (2010).
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equal 3/4ths. But then, if you were to go on to learn Ch(A) ≤ 3/4,
we would presumably want to impose the new constraint that your cre-
dence in A be your (new) expectation of the chance of A, C(A) = 5/8.
At that point, the constraints on your credences would be inconsistent.
It’s clear that the constraint C(A) = 3/4 should be ditched and that
the constraint C(A) = 5/8 should take its place, though it’s less clear
whether there’s any principled story to be told about why. In any case,
this kind of approach seems to me to confuse evidence—which is the
input to an updating rule—with the rational response to that evidence—
which is the output of an updating rule. To see why, think about what
would happen, had you first learnt that Ch(A) ⩽ 3/4, and then learn
that Ch(A) ⩾ 1/2. In that case, we would have to say that the evidence
Ch(A) ⩽ 3/4 imposes the constraint that C(A) = 3/8, and that the
evidence Ch(A) ⩾ 1/2 imposes the constraint that C(A) = 5/8. But
why should changing the order in which you receive the evidence about
chance make a difference to the constraints which that evidence im-
poses? Whether you already know thatCh(A) ⩾ 1/2 shouldmake a dif-
ference towhich credences you adopt when you learn thatCh(A) ⩽ 3/4;
but I don’t see why the evidence you’ve already received wouldmake any
difference to the constraint which the piece of evidence Ch(A) ⩽ 3/4
itself imposes on your credences. We should be able to specify the evi-
dential constraints imposed by a new piece of evidence in a way which
is independent of your prior credences and your pre-existing evidence.
Whether we adopt this proposal or not, if you update your credences
in the way Williamson advises, you will violate the rule of condition-
alization whenever you stand to learn something about the chances. So,
whenever you stand to learn something about the chances, you will be
susceptible to a Dutch book strategy, as Teller (1973, 1976) and Lewis
(1999) have shown. Williamson recognizes this, but contends that sus-
ceptibility to a Dutch book strategy is no vice. He argues for this as fol-
lows: suppose you are about to listen to the defense. You know that they
will only present evidence which supports the defendant’s innocence.
So, if you know you’re rational, then you know that your credence in
the defenant’s innocence will go up, no matter what you hear. So, after
their defense, you’ll sell back a bet on the defendant’s guilt for less than
you paid for it.17 But Williamson is wrong that rationality will compel
you to lower your credence in the defendant’s guilt no matter what you
17. See (Williamson, 2010, §4.4).
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hear. An exceptionally weak defense should make you more confident
that the defendant is guilty (think: that’s the best they could do?).
In sum: the POI and the PP are incompatible. The defender of
the POI can offer surrogate chance deference principles besides the PP.
However, these surrogates are not very plausible. They will tell you to
not change your credence that A, even when your expectation of the
chance of A has been raised. We could try to get around this prob-
lem, but only by customizing the evidential constraints on a case-by-
case basis. And, even if we did this, the surrogate would expose you to
diachronic exploitability.
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